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Abstract. Safety-critical systems are growing more complex and be-
coming increasingly autonomous. Runtime Verification (RV) has the po-
tential to provide protections when a system cannot be assured by con-
ventional means, but only if the RV itself can be trusted. In this paper,
we proffer a number of challenges to realizing high-assurance RV and
illustrate how we have addressed them in our research. We argue that
high-assurance RV provides a rich target for automated verification tools
in hope of fostering closer collaboration among the communities.
1 Introduction
Safety-critical systems, such as aircraft, automobiles, and medical devices are
those systems whose failure could result in loss of life, significant property dam-
age, or damage to the environment [23]. The grave consequences of failure have
compelled industry and regulatory authorities to adopt conservative design ap-
proaches and exhaustive verification and validation (V&V) procedures to prevent
mishaps. In addition, strict licensing requirements are often placed on human
operators of many safety-critical systems. In practice, the verification and valida-
tion of avionics and other safety-critical software systems relies heavily on system
predictability; and existing regulatory guidance, such as DO-178C [30], do not
have provisions to assure safety-critical systems that do not exhibit predictable
behavior at certification. Yet technological advances are enabling the develop-
ment of increasingly autonomous (IA) cyber-physical systems (CPS) that modify
their behavior in response to the external environment and learn from their ex-
perience. While unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) and self-driving cars have
the potential of transforming society in many beneficial ways, they also pose
new dangers to public safety. The algorithmic methods such as machine learning
that enable autonomy lack the salient feature of predictability since the system’s
behavior depends on what it has learned. Consequently, the problem of assur-
ing safety-critical IA CPS is both a barrier to industrial use and a significant
research challenge [10].
Runtime verification (RV) [15], where monitors detect and respond to prop-
erty violations at runtime, has the potential to enable the safe operation of safety-
critical systems that are too complex to formally verify or fully test. Technically
speaking, a RV monitor takes a logical specification φ and execution trace τ of
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state information of the system under observation (SUO) and decides whether τ
satisfies φ. The Simplex Architecture [33] provides a model architectural pattern
for RV,where a monitor checks that the executing SUO satisfies a specification
and, if the property is violated, the RV system will switch control to a more con-
servative component that can be assured using conventional means that steers
the system into a safe state. High-assurance RV provides an assured level of
safety even when the SUO itself cannot be verified by conventional means.
Contributions: During the course of our research we have been guided by the
question “what issues must be addressed in a convincing argument that high-
assurance RV can safeguard a system that cannot be otherwise assured?” In
this paper, we chronicle a number of challenges we have identified that must
be thoroughly addressed in order to actualize high-assurance RV. We hope that
this helps inform other researchers that wish to apply RV to safety-critical sys-
tems. We examine how these issues have been addressed in our work on the
Copilot RV framework [26, 28]. A theme of our research has been the applica-
tion of lightweight formal methods to achieve high-assurance and we identify
opportunities for closer collaboration between the RV and tool communities.
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Fig. 1. The Copilot toolchain.
Copilot is an RV framework targeted at safety-critical hard real-time systems,
which has served as an experimental platform enabling a research program in
high-assurance RV. Copilot is a domain specific language embedded (EDSL) in
the functional programming language Haskell tailored to programming monitors
for hard real-time, reactive systems.1
Copilot is a stream based language where a stream is an infinite sequence of
values that must conform to the same type. All transformations of data in Copi-
lot must be propagated through streams. Copilot guarantees that specifications
compile to constant-time and constant-space implementations. Copilot streams
mimic both the syntax and semantics of Haskell lazy lists with the exception
that operators are automatically promoted point-wise to the list level.
Two types of temporal operators are provided in Copilot, one for delaying
streams and one for looking into the future of streams:
(++) :: [a] → Stream a → Stream a
drop :: Int → Stream a → Stream a
Here xs ++ s prepends the list xs at the front of the stream s. The expression
drop k s skips the first k values of the stream s, returning the remainder of the
stream.
Copilot’s toolchain is depicted in Figure 1. A Copilot program is reified
(i.e., transformed from a recursive structure into explicit graphs) and then some
domain-specific type-checking is done. At this point, we have transformed the
program into the “core” language, an intermediate representation. The core pack-
age contains an interpreter that can be viewed as an operational semantics for
the language. The back-end translates a Copilot core program into the language
of another Haskell-hosted EDSL, Symbolic Bit Vectors (SBV)2, which we use to
generate C monitors.
3 From Whence the Specification
Sound systems engineering practices as well as regulatory guidelines typically
mandate safety-critical systems have detailed written requirements as well as a
thorough safety assessment. Safety is a system level property, so if RV is to pro-
vide safety guarantees, then the monitor specifications must flow down from the
requirements and safety analyses. Indeed, Rushby’s study [31,32] demonstrated
that a convincing safety case for an IA system protected by RV demands evi-
dence that the monitor specifications are derived from validated requirements
and that the monitor specifications should include checks of the assumptions on
which safe operation of the system rests are indeed satisfied.
Challenge: Monitor specifications should derive from system level requirements
and assumptions that have been validated by domain experts.
As machine intelligence replaces people, RV is likely to be called upon to en-
force safe behaviors that humans began learning in early childhood. For an au-
tonomous automobile controlled by machine learning, a safety property might be
1 https://github.com/Copilot-Language
2 http://hackage.haskell.org/package/sbv, BSD3 license.
“do not hit a pedestrian” or “do not behave erratically”, but what do these state-
ments mean precisely? A more precise statement such as “maintain five meters
distance from any object in the vehicle path” may be more formal, but is that
what the expert wanted? Phrases like “erratic behavior” may seem reasonable to
a mature adult, but formalizing such statements can be an open ended problem.
Challenge: Precisely formalize safety properties in a logic.
Copilot Approach: We are conducting case studies informed by collaborations
with colleagues who are developing new concepts that will enable aircraft to
perform autonomous flight by self-optimizing their four-dimensional trajectories
while conforming to constraints such as required times of arrival generated by
air-traffic service providers on the ground. Many of the proposed algorithms [21]
do not behave with the predictability of conventional systems. Consequently, it is
not possible to provide the required level of assurance that the newly computed
trajectories preserve safe aircraft separation. The separation requirement for two
aircraft is specified by a minimum horizontal separation D (typically, 5 nauti-
cal miles). Fortuitously, colleagues at NASA have discovered analytical formula,
called criteria [25], that characterize resolution maneuvers that both ensure safe
separation when one aircraft maneuvers and ensures separation when two con-
flicting aircraft both maneuver. The criteria have been extensively validated by
domain experts who conducted sophisticated simulations as well as performing
formal mathematical proofs using the Prototype Verification System (PVS) the-
orem prover. We have encoded these conditions as Copilot specifications. The
criteria for horizontal separation for two aircraft is given as follows:
horiz_criteria(s, ,v) ≡ s · v ≥ 
√
s · s−D2
D
det(s,v)
∧ det(s,v) ≤ 0
where s is the relative position vector for the two aircraft,  is 1 or −1, and v is
the relative velocity vector after a planned maneuver. The position is assumed
to be given in Earth Centered Earth Fixed (ECEF) coordinates. This is easily
encoded in Copilot’s EDSL as:
hor_rr :: Stream Double → Stream Double → Stream Double
hor_rr sx sy= (sqrt $ (normsq2dim sx sy) - (minHorSep ∗ minHorSep)
) / (minHorSep)
horizontalCriterionForConflictResolution :: Stream Double →
Stream Double → Stream Double → Stream Double → Stream
Double → Stream Bool
horizontalCriterionForConflictResolution sx sy e vx vy = ((
scalar2dim sx sy vx vy) ≥ (e ∗ (hor_rr sx sy) ∗ (det2dim sx
sy vx vy)) ) && ( ((det2dim sx sy vx vy) ∗e) ≤ 0.0)
Formalizing the assumptions about the reliability of communicating aircraft
position data is ongoing work. A case study formalizing what it means for a UAS
to behave erratically is planned as future work.
4 Observability
Guaranteeing that all the data required by the specification is actually observ-
able is one of the principal engineering challenges of RV. In embedded systems,
the RV specification often involves data from a number of different types of
data sources, including state data of executing programs, sensor data, as well as
data that is communicated from other systems. The safety properties of cyber-
physical systems are often formulated by aerospace and automobile engineers
that are domain experts, but can have varying degrees of understanding of the
computing systems, so the RV engineer needs to be very proactive in addressing
the observability issue. In embedded systems, the closed nature of the hard-
ware platforms and proprietary issues can make it impossible to observe the
information required in the specification. Additional sensors may be needed or
communication data formats changed. At times it is necessary to change the
specification so that it only depends on observable data. The observability issue
may seem like an “engineering detail”, but based on our experience, it is often
a significant obstacle resulting in delays, frustration, and sometimes preventing
progress altogether.
Challenge: Determining observability of the state and environment variables in
the specification.
Copilot Approach: How a RV framework obtains state data impacts the proper-
ties that can be monitored. Many RV frameworks such as MAC [22] and MOP [8]
instrument the software and hardware of the SUO so that it emits events of in-
terest to the monitor. While attractive from the viewpoint of maximizing state
observability, the additional overhead may affect worst case execution times and
consequently the scheduling; regulatory guidelines may also require recertifica-
tion of that system. Copilot and several other RV frameworks [6, 13, 20] opt
to sacrifice complete observability by sampling events. Copilot monitors run
as dedicated threads and sample program variables and state information via
shared memory. Currently, we rely on scheduling analysis and experimentation
to ensure that we sample values at a sufficient rate that specification violations
are detected. This has been very successful when the implementation platform
is running a real-time operating system (RTOS) with deterministic scheduling
guarantees, but we cannot make strong assertions of efficacy running on less
specialized systems.
A critical lesson learned in the course of conducting many case studies is to
ask questions about observability early and often. If monitoring the state of an
executing program, is it possible that the monitor fails to detect a state change?
It is often necessary to read sensor data to obtain the required state data (e.g.
aircraft pitch and vehicle position) or environmental data (e.g. temperature).
If it is raw sensor data, do we apply filters before feeding the data into the
monitors? Is the data available in the same coordinate systems demanded of
the specification? Can we ensure the integrity and provenance of the data being
observed?
The aircraft safe separation criteria specification introduced in Section 3
requires the monitor to observe state data for both the aircraft the monitor is
executing on as well as the “intruder” aircraft. Hence, the monitors must sample
data from executing programs (planned maneuver), onboard positioning sensors,
and data broadcast from other vehicles.
5 Traceability
To ensure that the requirements and safety analyses performed early in sys-
tems development are reflected throughout the lifecycle, many guidelines for
safety-critical software, such as DO-178C, require documentation of traceability
from requirements to object code. Consequently, to promote the acceptance of
high-assurance RV, the monitor generation frameworks should produce docu-
mentation that supports traceability from specification to monitor code.
Challenge: Support traceability from the requirements and system level analysis
to the actual monitor code.
Copilot Approach: Using SBV to generate C monitors may create many small
files and it can be quite difficult to relate this to the specification. The code
generation module has recently been revised to generate documentation that
improves traceability. The user can insert labels in their specifications that flow
down to the documentation. The translation process creates C header files with
documentation formatted to be processed by the plain text graph description
language processor DOT [1]. Each C function has accompanying auto-generated
graphical documentation.
In the case of the following example:
hor_rr sx sy = (label "?hor_rr_dividend" $ sqrt $ (normsq2dim sx
sy) - (minHorSep ∗ minHorSep)) / (label "?hor_rr_divisor" $
minHorSep)
the SBV translation breaks this relatively simple expression into numerous small
C functions and function parameters get instantiated with the variables being
monitored. The auto-generated documentation for one of these files appears
similar to Figure 2, where the labels have the names of the program variables
being monitored.
6 Fault-Tolerant RV
ext_sqrt OP2:-
ext_ident_double_8 OP2:*
ext_min_hor_sep ext_min_hor_sep
Fig. 2. Autogenerated Documentation
Safety engineers employ a range of established methods to identify hazards
and failure modes [3]. The level of desired reliability determines what faults the
system must be designed to tolerate. If RV is to be the guarantor of safety, then
it must at least meet the level of reliability demanded of the system as a whole.
Thus, high-assurance RV should be designed to be fault-tolerant [7], meaning
it continues to provide its required functionality in the presence of faults. A
fault-tolerant system must not contain a single point of failure.
Ideally, the RV and the SUO should not be subject to common modes of
failure. For instance, software errors in the SUO such as numerical overflows and
memory leaks that can render a system inoperable should not affect the RV.
A fault-tolerant system must also be robust in the presence of hardware faults
such as sensor failures and voltage spikes. A fault-containment region (FCR) is
a region in a system designed to ensure faults do not propagate to other regions.
The easiest way to ensure this is to physically isolate one FCR from another.
However, FCRs may need to communicate, hence they share channels. An FCR
containing a monitor may need to share a channel with the SUO. Care must be
taken to ensure faults cannot propagate over these channels. In the case of ultra-
reliable systems, the only way to achieve the level of fault tolerance demanded
of the system is by hardware replication that demands complex hardware redun-
dancy management software.
Challenge: Isolating failures so that RV should not be rendered inoperable by the
same failure conditions that impact the SUO.
Copilot Approach: Fault-tolerant RV has been an ongoing topic of investigation
for the Copilot research group. The avionics industry has been migrating away
from federated systems toward the use of integrated modular avionics that pro-
vide fault tolerance as a service. The Aeronautical Radio, Incorporated (ARINC)
653 [4] compliant RTOS provides temporal and spatial partitioning guarantees
so applications can safely share resources. The Copilot group has been investigat-
ing design patterns for implementing fault-tolerant RV on such platforms [11].
Monitors are run on the same nodes as the software being monitored, but in
separate partitions. Monitoring tasks executing in a separate partition observe
the state of the executing program through very restricted channels that pre-
serve the isolation guarantees. The spacial and temporal protections provided
by ARINC 653 keep the monitors safe from other programs running on the same
system.
Systems that need to be ultrareliable typically must employ redundancy to
tolerate the most pernicious faults such as a Byzantine fault (i.e., a fault in
which different nodes interpret a single broadcast message differently). There
have been documented incidents in critical avionics where sensors failed in a
Byzantine fashion with the potential to affect a vehicle’s safety. The aircraft
horizontal separation criteria in Section 3 depends on reliably sensing the posi-
tion and velocity of both systems. In earlier work [28], we have addressed this
issue in a case study where a system had redundant sensors and Copilot moni-
tors performed Byzantine exchange and majority voting to create a system that
could tolerate a single Byzantine fault. Fault injection testing was performed
along with flight tests. The hardware used in these experiments were commod-
ity microprocessors, but we have recently bought Mil-Spec hardened processors
that are more reliable when operating under varying environmental conditions.
7 Do No Harm
The RV components must be composed with the SUO so that they are exe-
cuting in parallel with the SUO. Care must be taken that the RV system itself
does not compromise the correct functioning of the SUO. For instance execut-
ing monitors may impact timing and scheduling. Care must also be taken that
any instrumentation of the SUO does not affect the functional correctness. In
large systems, there are likely to be many monitors running; each monitor might
trigger different steering procedures. A common pattern when things go wrong
in complex safety-critical systems is that many alerts are sounded simultane-
ously often placing a burden on a human operator to sort things out. One can
easily envision an analogous situation where several monitors detect violations,
triggering their respective steering procedures. Hence it is necessary to verify
that these different steering procedures do not interact with each other in ways
that could compromise safety. In summary, high-assurance RV must uphold the
Hippocratic oath “to do no harm”. Ideally, we would formulate a noninterfer-
ence theorem and the RV framework would produce a proof certificate that the
composed system satisfies the property.
Challenge: Assured RV must safely compose with the SUO.
Copilot Approach: The Copilot research group has yet to develop a general the-
ory of RV noninterference, but we have made a number of design decisions with
this in mind. For instance, the choice of monitoring system state through sam-
pling was a deliberate attempt to minimize interference with the SUO. Running
monitors in separate partitions on an ARINC 653 compliant RTOS as discussed
in Section 6 ensures that any fault in the RV will not negatively affect the execut-
ing SUO. The RTOS scheduler also provides guarantees that a missed deadline
in the RV does not affect the SUO.
8 Monitor Specification Correctness
As RV is applied to guarantee sophisticated properties, the monitor specifi-
cations themselves will grow in complexity and may become prone to error. Our
experience with a number of case studies involving complex monitor properties
is that we were able to discover many simple theorems that should hold for a cor-
rect specification. Hence, applying formal proof tools to the monitors to ensure
they are correct can safeguard that the last line of defense is actually effective.
Ideally, specification verification capabilities should be integrated into the RV
framework so engineers could write specifications, verify their correctness, and
generate monitors in a seamless fashion.
Challenge: Assure the correctness of the monitor specification.
Copilot Approach: Copilot supports automated proofs of specification proper-
ties through its Copilot.Theorem module. Applying a “synchronous observer”
approach [17], properties about Copilot programs are specified within Copilot
itself. In particular, properties are encoded with standard Boolean streams and
Copilot streams are sufficient to encode past-time linear temporal logic [18].
A proposition is a Copilot value of type Prop Existential or Prop Universal,
which can be introduced using exists and forall, respectively. These are func-
tions taking as an argument a normal Copilot stream of type Stream Bool.
Propositions can be added to a specification using the prop and theorem func-
tions, where theorem must also be passed a tactic for automatically proving
the proposition. Currently, proof engines based on Satisfiability Modulo Theo-
ries (smt) are used to discharge proofs. The Copilot prover was first introduced
in [16], where its utility was demonstrated in assuring notoriously subtle voting
algorithms.
In the course of the analysis of the separation criteria, a team of domain
experts used the PVS interactive prover to prove theorems that characterize
the correctness of the criteria. We were able to apply the Copilot prover using
Z3 [12] to prove many of these theorems within the Copilot framework. Among
the properties proven about the horizontal separation criteria are:
horiz_criteria(sx, sy, ,vx,vy)⇐⇒ horiz_criteria(−sx,−sy, ,−vx,−vy)
(horiz_criteria(sx, sy, ,vx,vy) ∧
horiz_criteria(sx, sy, ,wx,wy)) =⇒ horiz_criteria(sx, sy, ,vx,vy)
(horiz_criteria(sx, sy, ,vx,vy) ∧
horiz_criteria(sx, sy, ′,vx,vy)) =⇒  = ′
A few of the properties proven in PVS involve continuous mathematics that
remains beyond the capabilities of fully automated tools, but combined with
testing, we have a convincing argument that the specification is correct.
9 Correct monitors
RV frameworks apply sophisticated algorithms to synthesize monitors from spec-
ifications. In safety-critical systems, subtle errors in the translation process can
have potentially catastrophic consequences and consequently, a safety case for
assured RV must include evidence of the correctness of the translation process.
Challenge: There should be assurance arguments with evidence that executable
monitors correctly implement the specification. The monitor implementation should
not be susceptible to unsafe or undefined behaviors such as buffer and floating
point overflows.
Copilot Approach: The small Copilot interpreter can be seen as providing an
executable operational semantics for the Copilot language. As reported in [27],
our first efforts in monitor synthesis assurance were to support regression tests
for the semantics of the EDSL using Haskell’s QuickCheck [9] property test-
ing engine. Type-correct Copilot programs get randomly generated and output
from the interpreter is compared against the actual monitor. QuickCheck testing
uncovered a number of bugs during early development of the monitor synthe-
sis software. Among those bugs caught were forgotten witnesses needed by the
code generation tools. The testing also highlighted differences in how GCC and
Haskell implemented floating point numbers, without either violating the IEEE
floating point standard.
Recent work leverages light-weight verification tools for monitor synthesis
assurance. The process of translating a specification into a monitor transforms
an abstract syntax tree (AST) of the “core” language representation into a SBV
AST. SBV’s C code generation capabilities are used to generate executable C
code. To facilitate monitor verification, Copilot produces Hoare-logic style con-
tracts directly from the Copilot core representation independent of the monitor
generation process. The contracts are written in the ANSI C Specification Lan-
guage (ACSL) [5], an assertion language for specifying behavioral properties of
C programs in first-order logic. Each file has a contract with an ACSL post-
condition specifying the subexpression of the core AST representation that the
function should implement. Frama-C’s [14] WP deductive verification engine is
employed to prove that the code does indeed satisfy the contract. Deductive
verification tools have evolved quite a bit recently, but scalability is still an is-
sue. However, the verification is tractable because the translation process creates
separate C functions for subexpressions of a large expression.
An example of an annotated monitor C function follows:
/*@
assigns \ nothing;
ensures \ result == (((ext_ident_double_8) - (((ext_minimal_horizontal_separation) *
(ext_minimal_horizontal_separation)))));
*/
SDouble ext_sqrt_9_arg0(const SDouble ext_ident_double_8,
const SDouble ext_ownship_position_x, const SDouble ext_intruder_position_x,
const SDouble ext_ownship_position_y, const SDouble ext_intruder_position_y,
const SDouble ext_minimal_horizontal_separation)
{ const SDouble s0 = ext_ident_double_8;
const SDouble s5 = ext_minimal_horizontal_separation;
const SDouble s6 = s5 * s5;
const SDouble s7 = s0 - s6;
return s7; }
Frama-C’s WP plugin easily proves that the function satisfies the contract.
While this analysis demonstrates a faithful translation from core language
to C code, it elides the issues that arise performing floating point arithmetic.
We applied both the RV-Match tool [2] and Frama-C’s abstract interpretation
value analysis plugin to detect when floating point arithmetic produces infinite
values or not a number (NaN). The RV-Match C undefinedness checker found a
divide-by-zero error due to our initializing a variable to zero. The abstract inter-
preter produced warnings for every floating point operation. In the case of the
ext_sqrt_9_arg0 function, the value analysis produces the following warnings:
\ext_sqrt_9_arg0.c:41:[kernel] warning: non-finite double value
([-1.79769313486e+308 .. 1.79769313486e+308]): assert
\is_finite((double)(s5*s5)); ext_sqrt_9_arg0.c:42:[kernel] warning:
non-finite double value ([-1.79769313486e+308
.. 1.79769313486e+308]): assert \is_finite((double)(s0-s6));
ext_sqrt_9_arg0.c:30:[value] Function ext_sqrt_9_arg0: postcondition
got status unknown.
Applying domain specific knowledge about the bounds on the velocity and state
vectors eliminated this warning. At present, we must add these bounds to the
contracts by hand, but intend to generate such information during monitor gen-
eration.
Assurance All The Way Down: Having assured that the C code implementing
the monitor is correct, how can we guarantee that the executable binary code
correctly implements the C program? For Copilot, we have experimented with
using the verified Compcert compiler [24] to generate binaries. Unfortunately,
Compcert does not yet target many of the processors used in our experiments
limiting its utility.
10 Additional Challenges
The presentation so far has examined challenges in assured RV that have been
addressed in our research. In this section, we will raise three of the key additional
challenges that we have identified as critical to address in future work.
Safe Steering: The problem of what to do when a specification has been vi-
olated is one of the most thorny problems in high-assurance RV and almost
completely application dependent. The simplest action is to log the violation for
further analysis or raise an alarm for humans to intervene, but in many cases,
the RV system must take proactive steps to preserve safety. For an autonomous
robot, putting the system into a quiescent state may be a safe default operation
depending on the operating environment. In the case of an adaptive control sys-
tem, the RV framework may switch to a conventional controller, but whether
this re-establishes safety depends on many factors. In many domains, the chal-
lenge in constructing an assured safe steering algorithm may be as difficult as
constructing the adaptive autonomous algorithm itself.
Challenge: Verify the correctness and safety of the steering performed from any
viable system state once a specification violation is detected.
Predictive Monitors: Applying RV to application domains that have strict timing
constraints, such as an adaptive control system, raises many technical challenges.
It is imperative that the monitor detects that the adaptive controller is about
to lose stability in time to switch to a safe controller. In the case of our running
example, the RV system needs to detect that two aircraft are about to lose
separation in time for them to take corrective action. Assured predictive monitors
are needed, but much work remains to be done. Johnson et. al. [19] is a promising
approach to predictive monitoring for controllers, but the general problem is very
domain specific. Assured predictive monitoring remains a research challenge for
the RV community.
Challenge: The monitor should detect impending violations of the specification
and invoke the safety controller in time to preserve safe operation.
Secured RV: Adding more software or hardware to a system has the potential
to introduce vulnerabilities that that can be exploited by an attacker. Copilot
and many other RV frameworks generate monitors that have constant time and
constant space execution footprints and while this eliminates some common at-
tacks, it does not provide general protection. Every sensor and unauthenticated
message may contribute to the attack surface. If an attacker can trick the sys-
tems into a monitor specification violation, the triggered steering behavior may
itself constitute a denial-of-service attack. Future research is needed in identify-
ing attack surfaces and suitable techniques to thwart adversaries from turning
the RV meant to protect a system into a liability that exposes the system to
attack.
Challenge: Assured RV should not introduce security vulnerabilities into a sys-
tem.
11 Better Together
High-assurance RV will only become practical if there is accompanying inte-
grated tool support for verification and validation. From the perspective of a
researcher in high-assurance RV, engaging with the communities building static
analysis tools and proof engines seems obvious, especially in light of the fact
that regulatory bodies that govern many safety-critical systems are increasingly
willing to accept the analysis produced from such tools as evidence that can be
applied to certification [29]. Similarly, there are many features of RV that make
it a great target for the tool builder. For instance, there are formal specifica-
tions to work with and monitor code is generally small and conforms to coding
practices that are friendly to static analysis.
Several of the challenges we have raised for high-assurance RV are really
at the system level. Tools that can assist domain experts in validating safety
properties are sorely needed. As in our case study, the safety properties of cyber-
physical systems involve continuous mathematics. While advances in smt solvers
have been impressive, it is still necessary to often resort to using an interactive
theorem prover. There are many opportunities to design domain specific decision
procedures that would increase the utility of automated proof tools.
The problem of RV observability provides a rich source of problems for tool
builders. If the RV approach involves instrumenting code, then static analysis can
both assist in the instrumentation and prove that the instrumentation did not
affect the correctness of the code. If sampling, static analysis has the potential
to inform when to sample.
Floating point arithmetic is a source of problems that is readily amenable
to static analysis and proof. In our work, we applied abstract interpretation to
monitor source code, but analysis could be done at the specification level with
proof obligations flowing down to the monitor code.
Applying tools to verify monitor correctness makes so much sense that it
should be de rigueur. In Copilot, we applied deductive verification to verify the
correctness of the translation from specification to monitor code. Monitors have
many characteristics that make automatic proofs tractable, but the monitor
synthesis must generate code suitable for the tool being used.
12 Conclusion
High-assurance RV has the potential of becoming the avenue to assuring other-
wise unassurable IA safety-critical systems. We have presented a number of chal-
lenges that we have identified as barriers to actualizing high-assurance RV and
surveyed how we have addressed these challenges in the course of our research
using the Copilot framework. We hope this list will be useful to RV researchers
as they apply their own work to safety-critical systems. In addition, we believe
we have demonstrated the efficacy of applying light-weight formal methods tools
to address many of these challenges. Progress on these issues is likely to come
faster if a multidisciplinary approach is taken with domain specialists, safety
engineers and verification tool builders collaborating with RV researchers. Much
work remains and the list of challenges is likely to grow even as researchers solve
many of the issues raised.
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with Dr. Lee Pike (Galois). Jonathan Laurent (ENS Paris) and Chris Hath-
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